THOMAS M. ROSE, District Judge.
Mindy Monroe ("Monroe") brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") that she is not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to Social Security disability benefits. On May 24, 2013, United States Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman entered a Report and Recommendations (doc. #13) recommending that the Commissioner's Decision be affirmed. Monroe subsequently filed Objections (doc. #15) and the time has run and the Commissioner has not responded to Monroe's Objections. This matter is, therefore, ripe for decision.
Monroe sought financial assistance from the Social Security Administration by applying for Disability Insurance Benefits in January of 2008. Monroe claimed that she had been disabled since July 1, 2006, due to Crohn's disease, rheumatoid arthritis, anemia, bursitis, fatigue, osteoporosis and tendonitis.
The Commissioner denied Monroe's application initially and on reconsideration. Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Thomas McNichols, II ("McNichols") held a hearing following which he determined that Monroe is not disabled. The Appeals Council denied Monroe's request for review and ALJ McNichols' decision became the Commissioner's final decision. Monroe then appealed to this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
As required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 72(b), the District Judge has made a de novo review of the record in this case. Based upon the reasoning and citations of authority set forth in the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations (doc. #13) and in Monroe's Objections (doc. #15), as well as upon a thorough de novo review of this Court's file and a thorough review of the applicable law, this Court adopts the aforesaid Report and Recommendations in its entirety and, in so doing affirms the Commissioner's decision that Monroe is not disabled in accordance with Social Security regulations.
This Court's function is to determine whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ's decision. Bowen v. Commissioner of Social Security, 478 F.3d 742, 745-46 (6th Cir.2007). This Court must also determine whether the ALJ applied the correct legal criteria. Id.
Regarding the substantial evidence requirement, the ALJ's findings
The second judicial inquiry-reviewing the ALJ's legal criteria-may result in reversal even if the record contains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's factual findings. See Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746. A reversal based on the ALJ's legal criteria may occur, for example, when the ALJ has failed to follow the Commissioner's "own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right." Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746 (citing in part Wilson v. Commissioner of Social Security, 378 F.3d 541, 546-47 (6th Cir. 2004)).
In this case, the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and the ALJ applied the correct legal criteria. WHEREFORE, Monroe's Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations are OVERRULED, and this Court adopts the Report and Recommendations of the United States Magistrate Judge in its entirety. The Commissioner's decision that Monroe is not disabled in accordance with Social Security regulations is affirmed. Finally, the captioned cause is hereby ordered terminated upon the docket records of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, at Dayton.
MICHAEL J. NEWMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.
This is a Social Security disability benefits appeal. At issue is whether the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in finding Plaintiff not "disabled" and therefore unentitled to Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"). This case is before the Court upon Plaintiffs Statement of Errors (doc. 9), the Commissioner's Memorandum in Opposition (doc. 11), Plaintiffs Reply (doc. 12), the administrative record (doc. 6)
Plaintiff filed her application for DIB on January 31, 2008, asserting that she has
Following initial administrative denials of her application, Plaintiff received a hearing before ALJ Thomas McNichols, II on October 13, 2010.
PageID 52-64.
Thereafter, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's non-disability finding the final administrative decision of the Commissioner. PageID 41-44. See Casey v. Sec'y of H.H.S., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir.1993). Plaintiff then timely filed this appeal on April 13, 2012. Doc. 2.
At the time of the administrative hearing, Plaintiff was 31 years old. PageID 79. Plaintiff testified that she lives at her boyfriend's house with her three minor children (ages ten, four and two). PageID 79-80. She has a driver's license, and drove regularly up until three months prior to the hearing. PageID 81.
Plaintiff testified that her Crohn's disease has been in remission for the past eight years. PageID 84, 97. She experiences flare-ups once every two to three months. PageID 83-84, 87. Plaintiff takes no medication for Crohn's, but testified she experiences daily abdominal pain. Id. In addition, she suffers from rheumatoid arthritis in her shoulders, spine, and hips. PageID 85, 88, 90. She is unable to lift her arms over her head, but is able to use her hands. Id. She has not gone to a specialist for treatment of her arthritis; rather, she relies upon medication prescribed by her pain management physician. PageID 87.
Plaintiff testified that she also suffers from depression and anxiety, which cause her fatigue and hinder her ability to concentrate. PageID 90. She stated that she had not received any mental health treatment in the three months prior to the hearing, primarily due to the cost. PageID 91. Her pain management physician prescribes her medication for anxiety and panic attacks. PageID 93.
Plaintiff estimates she has the ability to: walk one block; stand no more than 15 minutes at a time; sit no more than 30 minutes at a time; and lift no more than a gallon of milk. PageID 100-03. She cares for her three children, prepares meals, washes dishes, and does laundry. PageID 104. She also smokes one-half pack of cigarettes daily. PageID 107.
Suman Srinivasan, a vocational expert ("VE"), also testified at the administrative hearing. PageID 113-22. The VE classified Plaintiff's past work as a "nurse's assistant" at the medium, semi-skilled level. PageID 115. Based on Plaintiffs age, education, work experience and RFC, the VE testified that Plaintiff would be unable to perform her past relevant work; nevertheless, she could perform, within the regional economy, 12,000 jobs at the light exertional level, and 3,000 jobs at the sedentary exertional level. PageID 118.
The Court's inquiry on a Social Security appeal is to determine (1) whether the ALJ's non-disability finding is supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether the ALJ employed the correct legal criteria. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Bowen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 745-46 (6th Cir.2007). In performing this review, the Court must consider the record as a whole. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978).
Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). When substantial evidence supports the ALJ's denial of benefits, that finding must be affirmed, even if substantial evidence also exists in the record upon which the ALJ could have found the claimant disabled. Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir.2001). Thus, the ALJ has a "`zone of choice' within which he can act without the fear of court interference." Id. at 773.
The second judicial inquiry — reviewing the correctness of the ALJ's legal analysis — may result in reversal even if the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Rabbers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir.2009). Thus, "a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right." Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746.
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must suffer from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. The impairment must render the claimant unable to engage in the work previously performed or in any other substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2).
Administrative regulations require a five-step sequential evaluation for disability determinations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) (4). Although a dispositive finding at any step ends the ALJ's review, see Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir.2007), the complete sequential review poses five questions:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); Miller v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.Supp.2d 816, 818 (S.D.Ohio 2001). A claimant bears the ultimate burden of establishing that he or she is "disabled" under the Social Security Act's definition. Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 274 (6th Cir.1997).
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by: (1) giving less than controlling weight to the opinion of her treating pain management physician, Lita Mathai, M.D.; and (2) failing to consider the combined effects of her impairments. Doc. 9 at PageID 922-26. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds neither argument to be meritorious.
Plaintiffs first assignment of error is premised upon an October 2010 report submitted by Dr. Mathai, in which she opined that Plaintiff has the ability to: carry no more than five pounds; occasionally lift and carry zero pounds; frequently lift and carry zero pounds; stand and walk no more than two or three hours; and sit no more than four hours in an eight-hour day. PageID 902-03. Additionally, Dr. Mathai reported that Plaintiff is completely unable to climb, balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, crawl, reach, pull, or handle. Id. Dr. Mathai stated that Plaintiff "has too many problems and limitations and severe pain that limit her ability to do any substantial work." PageID 904.
Plaintiff argues that, as a treating physician, Dr. Mathai's opinion is entitled to controlling weight. Doc. 9 at PageID 922. Rather, the ALJ accorded "little weight," reasoning:
PageID 61. The Court finds the ALJ's consideration of Dr. Mathai's opinion to be well supported by substantial evidence.
The opinions of treating physicians are typically entitled to controlling weight. Cruse v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 540 (6th Cir.2007). To that end, under the "treating physician rule," the ALJ is required to "generally give greater deference to the opinions of treating physicians than to the opinions of non-treating
Nevertheless, a treating physician's opinion is to be given controlling weight only if it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory techniques, and is not inconsistent with the other evidence of record. Id.; Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 530 (6th Cir.1997). Accordingly, an ALJ may properly reject a treating physician's opinion that does not meet these standards. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).
When the ALJ declines to give controlling weight to a treating physician's assessment, "the ALJ must still determine how much weight is appropriate by considering a number of factors, including the length of treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and any specialization of the treating physician." Blakley, 581 F.3d at 406. In accordance with this rule, the ALJ must give "good reasons" for the ultimate weight afforded the treating physician's opinion, based on the evidence in the record, and these reasons must be sufficiently specific to enable meaningful review of the ALJ's decision. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Social Security Ruling 96-2p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 9, at *5). The ALJ's failure to adequately explain the reasons for the weight given to a treating physician's opinion "denotes a lack of substantial evidence, even where the conclusion of the ALJ may be justified based upon the record." Id. at 407.
Furthermore, a treating source's opinion as to a claimant's employability is a legal conclusion, and not a "medical source opinion," as defined by Social Security regulations, which the ALJ must accept. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)-(d). Social Security regulations mandate that the question — of whether or not a claimant is disabled — is an administrative issue reserved solely to the province of the Commissioner. Id.; see also Warner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir.2004) ("The determination of disability is ultimately the prerogative of the Commissioner, not the treating physician"). Thus, the ALJ need not give either controlling or deferential weight to an opinion that a claimant is "disabled." See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1) ("A statement by a medical source that you are `disabled' or `unable to work' does not mean that we will find that you are disabled"); see also Soc. Sec. Ruling 96-5p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 2, at *2 ("Whether an individual is `disabled' under the Act. The regulations provide that the final responsibility for deciding issues such as these is reserved to the Commissioner").
Here, the ALJ adequately weighed Dr. Mathai's opinion with the other medical evidence of record, and clearly articulated "good reasons" for his conclusion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). For example, Dr. Mathai purportedly based her opinion on MRIs and x-rays of Plaintiff's back and shoulder. See PageID 900-01. The ALJ appropriately determined, however, that those imaging reports showed only minimal findings, and did not support Plaintiffs allegations of total disability. PageID 56-57, 61. In December 2005, x-rays of Plaintiff's lumbar spine
Furthermore, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Dr. Mathai's opinion is inconsistent with Plaintiff's reported daily activities. Notably, since the alleged onset date of disability, Plaintiff has given birth to two children, in addition to caring for and raising a third child. PageID 59-60, 424. In May 2008, Plaintiff reported that, on a daily basis, she takes care of her children; prepares meals for herself and children; get her oldest child ready for school; watches television; loads the dishwasher; gathers laundry; changes diapers; attends her son's baseball games; drives; visits with family members; and occasionally watches movies. PageID 427-28. See also PageID 217-23.
Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ's decision to give significant weight to the shared opinion of medical consultants Charles Derrow, M.D., and Gary Hinzman, M.D. — i.e. that Plaintiff has the RFC to occasionally lift up to 50 pounds; frequently lift up to 25 pounds; stand and/or walk for a total of about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; and sit 6 or so hours in an 8-hour workday, see PageID 451-57, 593 — as that opinion is consistent with the medical findings of record, and not rebutted by other substantial evidence. As noted above, the record strongly suggests that Plaintiff can perform a wide range of activities and is not disabled. See supra. As such, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's impairments, whether viewed singly or in combination, do not demonstrate disability. Id.
It is not the Court's role to sift through the facts and make a de novo determination of whether a claimant is disabled. The ALJ, not the Court, is the finder of fact. Siterlet v. Sec'y of H.H.S., 823 F.2d 918, 920 (6th Cir.1987). The ALJ reasonably undertook that role here. Id. So long as the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420. Where, as here, there is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's resolution of the disputed facts, the Court must affirm the ALJ even if the Court might have resolved those disputed facts in Plaintiff's favor had it been the trier of fact. Nunn v. Bowen, 828 F.2d 1140, 1144 (6th Cir. 1987).
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ "did not even address the disabling effect of the combination of [my] physical and mental impairments." Doc 9 at PageID 926. In support of this assertion, Plaintiff relies upon the Sixth Circuit's decision in Walker v. Sec'y of H.H.S., 980 F.2d 1066 (6th Cir.1992). In Walker, the Court reversed
However, the record in the present case reflects that the ALJ considered the combined effect of all of Plaintiff's impairments, including her history of Crohn's disease, chronic abdominal pain, rheumatoid arthritis, anxiety and depression. PageID 53-55. The ALJ considered Listings §§ 1.02 (major dysfunction of a joint) and 1.04 (disorders of the spine) in consideration of Plaintiff's history of rheumatoid arthritis. He found that the evidence does not show an inability to ambulate effectively for 12 months or more, as required by Listings §§ 1.02(A) or 1.04(C). Id. (citing to PageID 579, 622 and 646). Furthermore, the ALJ found no evidence of nerve root compression characterized by neuroanatomic distribution of pain, limitation of motion of the spine, motor loss (atrophy with associated muscle weakness or muscle weakness) accompanied by sensory or reflex loss or positive straight-leg raising test (sitting and supine), as required by Listing § 1.04(A). Id. (citing to PageID 263, 508, 578, 622 and 646).
The ALJ also determined that, "the claimant's Crohn's disease does not produce the signs and findings needed to meet the criteria of any listing in section 5.00 of the Listing of Impairments, as the record contains no evidence of gastrointestinal hemorrhage, stricture, obstruction, or ulceration, chronic liver disease, or nutritional compromise." PageID 54. Notably, Plaintiff testified that her Crohn's disease has been in remission for eight years, and she does not regularly take any prescribed medication for it. PageID 83-84.
The ALJ discussed Plaintiff's mental impairments of depression and anxiety under Listings §§ 12.04 and 12.06, but found that the evidence establishes only "mild" limitations in her activities of daily living and social functioning, and "moderate" limitations in concentration, persistence and pace — not "marked" or "extreme" levels required to meet or equal either Listing.
Further, in posing various hypothetical questions to the VE, the ALJ incorporated the combined effect of all the limitations associated with Plaintiffs impairments, including her exertional limitations, mental limitations, and need for immediate access to restroom facilities. PageID 115-19. The VE testified that a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy that Plaintiff could nevertheless perform with all of the limitations identified by the ALJ. PageID 118.
Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523, the ALJ is required to consider the "combined effect" of all a claimant's impairments in determining whether a medically severe combination of impairments exists. However, if the ALJ determines that a claimant does not have a medically severe
Here, the ALJ thoroughly considered the combined effects of Plaintiff's impairments in his decision, as well as in his hypotheticals to the VE. Although Plaintiff suffers from a variety of impairments, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion that the combination of those impairments is not medically severe, does not meet or equal any of the listed impairments, and does not support a finding of disability.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Plaintiffs the ALJ's non-disability finding supported by substantial evidence.
1. The Commissioner's non-disability finding be found supported by substantial evidence, and
2. This case be
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within
